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ABSTRACT
Data collected about individuals is regularly used to make deci-
sions that impact those same individuals. We consider settings
where sensitive personal data is used to decide who will receive
resources or benefits. While it is well known that there is a trade-
off between protecting privacy and the accuracy of decisions, we
initiate a first-of-its-kind study into the impact of formally private
mechanisms (based on differential privacy) on fair and equitable
decision-making. We empirically investigate novel tradeoffs on two
real-world decisions made using U.S. Census data (allocation of
federal funds and assignment of voting rights benefits) as well as a
classic apportionment problem.
Our results show that if decisions aremade using an ϵ-differentially
private version of the data, under strict privacy constraints (smaller
ϵ), the noise added to achieve privacy may disproportionately im-
pact some groups over others. We propose novel measures of fair-
ness in the context of randomized differentially private algorithms
and identify a range of causes of outcome disparities.
1 INTRODUCTION
Data collected about individuals is regularly used to make decisions
that impact those same individuals. One of our main motivations is
the common practice of statistical agencies which publicly release
statistics about groups of individuals that are then used as input to a
number of critical civic decision-making procedures. The resulting
decisions can have significant impacts on individual welfare or
political representation. For example:
• election materials must be printed in minority languages in
specified electoral jurisdictions (only) if certain conditions are
met, which are determined by published counts of minority
language speakers and their illiteracy rates.
• annual funds to assist disadvantaged children are allocated to
school districts, determined by published counts of the number
of eligible school-age children meeting financial need criteria;
• seats in legislative bodies (national and state legislatures and
municipal boards) are apportioned to regions based on their
count of residents. For example, seats in the Indian parliament
are allocated to states proportionally to their population.
In many cases, the statistics used to make these decisions are
sensitive and their confidentiality is strictly regulated by law. For
instance, in the U.S., Census data is regulated under Title 13 [1],
which requires that no individual be identified from any data re-
leased by the Census Bureau, and data released about students in
the U.S. is regulated under FERPA1. In the EU, data releases are
strictly regulated under GDPR2. Statistical agencies worldwide up-
hold privacy and confidentiality requirements by releasing statistics
that have passed through a privacy mechanism. In the U.S., a handful
of critical decisions (e.g. congressional apportionment) are made on
unprotected true values, but the vast majority of decisions are made
using privatized releases. Our focus is the impact of mechanisms
satisfying formal privacy guarantees (based on differential privacy
[9]) on resource allocation decisions.
The accuracy of the above decisions is clearly important, but it
conflicts with the need to protect individuals from the potential
harms of privacy breaches. To achieve formal privacy protection,
some error must be introduced into the properties of groups (i.e.
states, voting districts, school districts), potentially distorting the
decisions that are made. In the examples above, the consequences
of error can be serious: seats in parliament could be gained or lost,
impacting the degree of representation of a state’s citizens; funding
may not reach eligible children; or a district deserving minority
voting support may not get it, disenfranchising a group of voters.
The tradeoff between privacy protection and the accuracy of
decision making must therefore be carefully considered. The right
balance is an important social choice [4] and the model of differ-
ential privacy allows for a more precise analysis of this choice.
Maximizing the accuracy achievable under differentially privacy
has been a major focus of recent privacy research, resulting in
many sophisticated algorithmic techniques [11, 17]. Yet that ef-
fort has considered accuracy almost exclusively through aggregate
measures of expected error, which can hide disparate effects on
individuals or groups.
In this paper we look beyond the classic tradeoff between privacy
and error to consider fair treatment in decision problems based on
private data. If we accept that privacy protection will require some
degree of error in decision making, does that error impact groups
or individuals equally? Or are some populations systematically
disadvantaged as a result of privacy technology? These questions
are especially important now: the adoption of differential privacy is
growing [13, 14, 16, 21], and, in particular, the U.S. Census Bureau
is currently exploring differentially private methods for limiting
disclosure of 2020 census data [6, 27].
The contributions of our work include the following. We present
a novel study of the impact of common privacy algorithms on the
equitable treatment of individuals. In settings where the noise from
the privacy algorithm is modest relative to the statistics underlying
1The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012)
2General Data Protection Regulation, Council Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art. 4, of the
European Parliament
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a decision, impacts may be negligible. But when stricter privacy (i.e.,
small values of ϵ) is adopted (or decisions involve small populations),
significant inequities can arise. We demonstrate the importance of
these impacts by simulating three real-world decisions made using
sensitive public data: the allocation of federal funds, the assignment
of voting rights benefits, and parliamentary apportionment.
• We show that even if privacy mechanisms add equivalent noise
to independent populations, significant disparities in outcomes
can nevertheless result. For instance, in the federal funds allo-
cation use case, under strict privacy settings of ϵ = 10−3, some
districts receive over 500× their proportional share of funds
while others receive less than half their proportional share.
Under weaker privacy settings (ϵ = 10), this disparity is still
observed but on a much smaller scale.
• For assigning voting rights benefits to minority language com-
munities, we find that noise for privacy can lead to significant
disparities in the rates of correct identification of those deserv-
ing the benefits, especially under stricter privacy settings.
• Lastly, for the parliamentary apportionment problem, surpris-
ingly, there are settings of ϵ where the apportionment of seats
to Indian states based on the noisy data is more equitable, ex
ante, than the standard deterministic apportionment.
Our study reveals that the use of privacy algorithms involves com-
plex tradeoffs which can impact social welfare. Further, these im-
pacts are difficult to predict or control because they may be caused
by features of the privacy algorithm, the structure of the decision
problem, or properties of the input data.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section we
describe our problem setting, followed by related work in Section 3.
In Sections 4 to 6 we investigate fairness in the example problem
domains of voting rights, funds allocation, and apportionment,
respectively. We do not attempt to describe remedies in this initial
work, but discuss possible unfairness mitigations in Section 7.
Remark: This work uses only public data, released by the U.S. Census
Bureau and other institutions, and does not use any privacy algorithms
known to be in current use at these agencies. Therefore, our empirical
results do not measure the actual impacts of any agency practice
currently in use. Instead, we simulate the use of state-of-the-art pri-
vacy algorithms on real use-cases in order to understand and quantify
potential unfair impacts, should these privacy algorithms be adopted.
2 PROBLEM SETTING
Below we provide a general definition of the assignment problems
we consider, define differential privacy and assignment based on
private inputs, as well as our methodology for assessing fairness.
2.1 Assignment Problems
We assume a universe of individuals each described by a record in
a table I . Individuals are divided into disjoint assignee populations,
each population denoted by a label a ∈ A. In our example problems,
assignee populations are characterized by, and labeled with, the
geographic region in which they reside (e.g. state, county, school
district). For example, we may have a = Wyoming and use Ia to
denote the set of records for all Wyoming residents.
An assignment method M : A → O associates a resource or
benefit with each assignee population, formalized as an outcome
from an outcome set O . We are primarily concerned with equitable
treatment of assignee populations in terms of the outcomes they
receive from an assignment.
The assignment methods we consider are deterministic (in the
absence of privacy protection) and depend on properties of the
assignee populations, which are described by statistics. These are
formalized by one or more statistical queries Q , evaluated on the
records corresponding to the assignee population. For example, we
may write Q = {tot} where tot(Ia ) is the query that computes the
total population of an assignee a. These statistics are stored in a
matrix X ∈ RA×Q , indexed by elements a ∈ A and q ∈ Q such that
Xqa = q(Ia ). An assignment method M will typically be defined
with respect to this matrix of statistics X, and we use the notation
M(a;X) to make this dependence clear. The vector of outcomes
o ∈ OA, formed from elements oa =M(a;X), is the ground truth
assignment because it is computed on the true, unmodified statistics
about the assignee populations.
Tables 1 to 3 (in the later sections) contain the formal descrip-
tions of the assignment methods for our three example problems,
including a specification of the assignee population, the outcome
space, the query set, and the rule underlying the assignment.
2.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [9, 11] is a formal model of privacy that offers
each individual a persuasive guarantee: namely that any released
data computed from the sensitive input would have been almost
as likely had the individual opted-out. More formally, differential
privacy is a property of a randomized algorithm that bounds the
difference in output probabilities induced by changes to an individ-
ual’s data. Let nbrs(I ) be the set of databases differing from I in at
most one record.
Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy [9]). A randomized algorithm
A is ϵ-differentially private if for any instance I , any I ′ ∈ nbrs(I ),
and any outputs O ⊆ Ranдe(A):
Pr [A(I ) ∈ O] ≤ exp(ϵ) × Pr [A(I ′) ∈ O]
Differentially private algorithms protect individuals and all of
their associated properties, and in addition, every individual enjoys
the same bound on privacy loss, which is quantified by (a function
of) the privacy parameter ϵ . Smaller ϵ implies greater privacy but
greater noise, and the parameter ϵ is sometimes referred to as the
privacy loss “budget”. A useful property of statistics computed in a
differentially private manner is that any subsequent computations
that use those statistics are also differentially private for the same
ϵ (assuming they do not also use the sensitive data).
We use two privacy mechanisms in this paper (details in Ap-
pendix A). The first is the standard Laplace mechanism [9]. While
the Laplace Mechanism is a fundamental building block of many
differentially private algorithms, it can offer sub-optimal error if
applied directly to some tasks. Therefore, we also consider the Data-
and Workload-Aware (DAWA) algorithm [20]. It is one of a number
of recently-proposed algorithms (cf. [17]) which introduce complex
noise that is adapted to the input data. These techniques can offer
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substantially reduced error rates in some settings, but may intro-
duce statistical bias in the estimates produced. This is in contrast
to the Laplace mechanism, which produces unbiased estimates,
and with error that is independent of the input. We chose DAWA
because it was reported to perform well in benchmarks [17].
2.3 Assignment Using Private Inputs
Given an assignment problem, we protect the privacy of the mem-
bers of each assignee population by answering the queries in Q
using differentially private mechanism AQ . The resulting noisy
query answers satisfy differential privacy for a given privacy pa-
rameter ϵ : AQ (I , ϵ) = X˜. We then assume the private assignments
are computed with M, using X˜ in place of X: o˜a = M(a; X˜). As
noted above, o˜ inherits the privacy guarantee of X˜.
WhileM is deterministic, whenM is composed with the ran-
domized private computation of statistics, the result is a random-
ized assignment algorithm, inducing a probability distribution over
outcome vectors. Assessments of fairness must therefore be proba-
bilistic in nature. The expected error in the statistics, introduced by
the privacy mechanism is: E[| |X˜ − X| |] (for a suitable metric | | · | |)
which we distinguish from error in the outcome space: E[| |o˜ − o| |]
Note that we assume the private computation of the supporting
statisticsQ is followed by the assignment methodM, used without
modification. In this initial work, we restrict our attention to this
data publishing model because it follows the practice of many sta-
tistical agencies: they release large sets of statistics (after invoking
disclosure limitation methods) which are typically treated as true in
subsequent decision making. We mention alternatives in Section 7.
2.4 Methodology
The example problems we consider in Sections 4 to 6 assign re-
sources or benefits to populations according to properties of those
populations that define their entitlement. For example, for Title 1
funding (Section 5), a school district’s entitlement is proportional to
the number of students who meet a specific qualification condition.
Our goal is not to question the fairness of the declared entitlement
or the resulting ground truth assignment, as these are typically
mandated by law. Instead, we consider the change in outcomes due
to the introduction of privacy protection.
Since different populations have different entitlements, we do
not seek to treat each population equally, but instead to treat equals
equally. However, with a randomized assignment method, even
identical populations will receive different outcomes over runs of
the algorithm, so we must evaluate equal treatment in expecta-
tion or with high probability. We provide problem-specific fairness
measures in the sections that follow.
3 RELATEDWORK
While fairness and privacy are topics that have been considered
by philosophers and theologians for thousands of years, it is only
recently that these values have begun to be engineered into al-
gorithms. Differential privacy [9, 11] provides a formal model for
reasoning about and controlling a quantitative measure of privacy
loss. Fairness has been formalized in economics, and, more recently,
in definitions emerging from machine learning [7, 8, 19, 22, 26].
Yet relatively little work has considered the direct interaction
of privacy and fairness. Dwork and Mulligan [10] warn against
the expectation that privacy controls and transparency alone can
offer resistance to discrimination in the context of large-scale data
collection and automated classification. And Dwork et al. [8] pro-
pose a framework for fair classification which they show can be
viewed as a generalization of differential privacy. Both of these
focus on settings distinct from ours. Conceptually closest to our
work is the recent position paper in which Ekstrand et al. [12] raise
a number of questions about the equitable provision of privacy
protections (privacy-fairness) and equitable impacts of privacy-
protection mechanisms (accuracy-fairness). Our paper can be seen
as a response to some of those questions, in a particular setting and
for the particular model of differential privacy.
Economics& theTheory of Social Choice: In forthcomingwork,
Abowd and Schmutte [4] characterize accuracy and privacy protec-
tion as competing social goods and invoke an economic framework
in which the demand for accuracy is balanced with the demand
for privacy. They use the model of differential privacy to quantify
privacy loss and study Title I funds allocation in detail.
They measure inaccuracy using total squared error, a metric stan-
dard in the privacy community, and explain that this corresponds
to utilitarian social welfare. This work inspired ours, motivating us
to ask whether there are other social welfare functions to consider
in the design of privacy algorithms.
In the literature on social choice, fair allocation methods have
been widely studied. Two of the example problems we consider
are instances of fair division problems. Funds allocation is a fair
division problem for a divisible and homogeneous resource (since
money can be divided and only the amount matters) where agents
(in our example, school districts) value the resource equally but
have differing rights to the resource (e.g. based on eligible pop-
ulation). This is a trivial fair division problem whose solution is
a proportional division. In our setting, the division deviates from
proportional because the information about agents’ rights to the
resource is noisy. We are not aware of fairness definitions which
consider this variant directly, although Xue [28] considers a related
scenario where agents rights are uncertain and proposes a division
that discounts an agent’s allocation accordingly.
Apportionment is a fair division problem for an indivisible and
homogeneous good (since seats cannot be divided and only the
number of seats matters) where agents (in our example, states)
value the resource equally but have differing rights to the resource
(determined by population). Again, in our setting we must consider
the impact of noisy information about agents’ rights. While the
study of apportionment methods and their properties has a long
history, we are aware of no existing approaches to cope with noisy
inputs. The closest related work may be that of Grimmett [15]
which proposes a randomized apportionment method along with a
fairness criterion we consider in Section 6.
Fairness in Machine Learning: A number of fairness definitions
have been proposed recently for assessing the impacts of predic-
tive algorithms [7, 8, 19, 22, 26], primarily focused on algorithms
that assign scores or classifications to individuals. Fairness criteria
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measure the degree of disparate treatment for groups of individ-
uals who should be treated equally (e.g. males and females in the
context of hiring). Our example problem concerning minority lan-
guage benefits is related since the goal is to classify jurisdictions.
However, rather than studying the impact of a classifier that may
display biased performance on unseen examples, we have a fixed
decision rule (mandated by law) but error is introduced into out-
comes because of noise in the input statistics. Although we could
certainly compare impacts across groups (e.g. whether Hispanic
and Chinese minority language speakers are treated equally) we
are also concerned with equitable treatment of arbitrary pairs of
jurisdictions. The metric we use for this problem is related to error
rate balance [7] but other metrics could also be considered.
StatisticalAgencyPractices: Statistical agencies like the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau have considered the potential impacts of inaccuracy
and bias in their data products for decades. Broadly, errors may
arise from sampling, data cleaning, or privacy protection. Census
data products derived from surveys (rather than censuses) include
margins-of-error representing estimates of uncertainty due to sam-
pling. Margins-of-error are intended to quantify sampling error but
have not historically considered the distortion introduced by the
data transformations applied for privacy protection.
In most cases, released data are treated as true by end users:
assignment and allocation methods are applied directly to released
summary statistics without any modification to take into account
potential inaccuracies. We are not aware of systematic studies of po-
tential bias in the statistics currently released by statistical agencies,
however Spielman observed that margins-of-error can be corre-
lated with income levels in some Census products, leading to greater
inaccuracies for low-income persons [24, 25].
The Census Bureau recently announced that a prototype dis-
closure limitation system based on differential privacy was being
tested for potential use in the 2020 Census of Population and Hous-
ing [6]. This motivates a careful consideration of the implications
of differentially private mechanisms on both accuracy and fairness.
While the U.S. Census Bureau is required by law to protect
individuals’ privacy, it is also obligated to support accurate decision
making. It therefore makes strategic choices about the accuracy
of its released products. For some critical assignment problems
(e.g. apportionment and redistricting), the Census forgoes privacy
protection in order to favor accurate allocation and this choice is
supported by law. In other cases, such as minority language benefits,
special variance reduction methods have been adopted to boost
accuracy [2]. But, for legacy privacy methods employed by the
Census, it is not possible for users to evaluate potential bias.
4 PROBLEM 1: MINORITY LANGUAGE
VOTING RIGHTS
The Voting Rights Act is federal legislation, passed in 1965, which
provides a range of protections for racial and language minorities.
Among its many provisions is Section 203, describing conditions
under which local jurisdictions must provide language assistance
during elections. Each jurisdiction (e.g. a county) is evaluated for
each of 68 identifiedminority languages. If theymeet the conditions,
they are found to be “covered” by the provision, and must provide
Table 1: Voting Rights, Minority Language Determinations
Assignees are all combinations of U.S. voting jurisdictions with each of 68
minority language categories.
• Assignees: a = (j, l ) ∈ Jurisdictions × Languages
• Outcomes: {Covered, Not-covered}
• Q = {vac, lep, l it } where
vac(Ia ): voting age citizens in j speaking language l .
lep(Ia ): voting age citizens in j speaking language l , and limited-
English proficient.
l it (Ia ): voting age citizens in j speaking language l , limited-
English proficient, and less than 5th grade education.
• M(a;X) =
(
Xlepa
Xvaca
> 0.05 ∨ Xlepa > 10000
)
∧ Xl ita
Xlepa
> 0.0131
all election information (including voter registration, ballots, and
instructions) in the minority language.
The coverage determination is made by the Census Bureau every
five years, using published population statistics. Most recently, in
2016, 263 jurisdictions (out of a total of approximately 8000) were
found to be covered under Section 203, across all language minority
groups [3]. While a small fraction of all jurisdictions are covered, an
estimated 21.7million voting-age citizens lived in these jurisdictions
and were potentially impacted by this benefit.
4.1 Problem Definition
Informally, a jurisdiction is covered for a language if it (i) has a large
enough population of voting age citizens who speak the language
and have limited proficiency in English, and (ii) if the illiteracy rate
of those speaking the language is higher than the national average.
Condition (i) can be satisfied in either of two ways: in percentage
terms (> 5%) or absolute terms (> 10, 000). Table 1 formalizes these
criteria, defining a binary outcome (“covered” or “not-covered”) for
each jurisdiction and for each minority language category.
Assessing FairnessTo evaluate fairness wemeasure, for each juris-
diction, the rate of correct classification. For a covered jurisdiction
j, i.e. M((j, l);X) = ‘Covered’ where l = ‘Hispanic’, we measure
Pr [M(a; X˜) = Covered] where the probability is over randomness
in the privacy algorithm. Similarly, for a not-covered jurisdiction
j we measure Pr [M(a; X˜) = ‘Not-covered’]. We evaluate the rates
of correct classification across the set of covered and not-covered
jurisdictions, measuring the disparity in classification accuracy.
4.2 Empirical Findings
Experimental SetupWe use the 2016 public-use data accompany-
ing the Census voting rights determinations, treating it as ground
truth. We focus on the “Hispanic” minority language group and
jurisdictions and jurisdictions that are counties or minor civil divi-
sions.We consider two algorithms for computing the noisy statistics
X˜. The first, which we call D-Laplace (Appendix A.1), is an adap-
tation of the Laplace mechanism in which the original queries are
decomposed to reduce sensitivity; the second algorithm is DAWA.
Finding M1: There are significant disparities in the rate of correct
classification across jurisdictions.
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(a) The D-Laplace algorithm, ϵ = {.01, .1, 1.0, 10.0}
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(b) The DAWA algorithm, ϵ = {.01, .1, 1.0, 10.0}
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Figure 1: Minority Language Determinations using D-Laplace and DAWA.
Because the failure to correctly classify a true positive is a more
costly mistake (potentially disenfranchising a group of citizens)
our results focus primarily on the classification rate for the truly
covered jurisdictions. For the 175 jurisdictions positively classified
for the “Hispanic” language, Figure 1(a) shows the correct classifi-
cation rate for each jurisdiction under the D-Laplace algorithm, for
four settings of the privacy parameter ϵ . Jurisdictions are ranked
from lowest classification rate to highest. For ϵ = 10.0, all of the
jurisdictions have a correct classification rate greater than 95%.
For ϵ = 1.0, 92% of jurisdictions have a correct classification rate
greater than 95%, while 74% do for ϵ = .1 and 33% do for ϵ = .01.
However, the plot shows that the lowest correct classification rate
is about 37% for ϵ = .01 and ϵ = .1 and it is 55% for ϵ = 1.0. This is
a significant disparity and more pronounced for lower ϵ values.
The conditions of Section 203 impose thresholds on language
minority populations (as shown in Table 1). A given covered ju-
risdiction may be closer to the thresholds, making it more likely
that perturbation from the privacy mechanism will cause a failure
to classify accurately. As a particular example, consider Maricopa
county (Arizona) and Knox county (Texas), which are both covered
jurisdictions. Maricopa county is correctly classified 100% of the
time by D-Laplace at ϵ = .1, while Knox county is correctly classi-
fied only 63% of the time. Because the D-Laplace algorithm produces
unbiased noise of equivalent magnitude to each jurisdiction, this
difference is fully explained by the distance to the classification
threshold: Maricopa county is further from the threshold than Knox
county so it is more robust to the addition of noise. Additionally, the
distance to the classification threshold is strongly correlated with
the population size, which is over 4,000,000 for Maricopa county,
but less than 4,000 for Knox county.
Thus, in this case, the significant differences in the rate of suc-
cessful classification across jurisdictions is a consequence of the
decision rule and its interaction with the noise added for privacy.
Although not shown in Figure 1, there are also significant dis-
parities in classification rates for the negative class (uncovered
jurisdictions). For example, the correct negative classification rate
for D-Laplace at ϵ = .1 ranges from 54% to 100%. Mistakes on the
negative class mean, in practice, that minority language materials
would be required of a jurisdiction which does not truly qualify,
resulting in an unnecessary administrative and financial burden.
Finding M2:While the DAWA algorithm offers equal or lower error
on the underlying statistics for small ϵ , it exacerbates disparities
in classification rates. Figure 1(b) shows a similar plot but for the
DAWA algorithm, however in this case the disparities are even
greater. The lowest classification rates are zero, for both ϵ = .01
and ϵ = .1, implying that a few covered jurisdictions will definitely
be not-covered for every run of the algorithm. Even with higher ϵ
values of 1.0 and 10.0, the lowest classification rates are below 25%.
At the high end, for ϵ = 10.0, 99% of the jurisdictions have a correct
classification rate greater than 95%, while 87% do for ϵ = 1.0, 61%
do for ϵ = 0.1 and 22% do for ϵ = .01.
It is important to note that the DAWA algorithm offers approxi-
mately equivalent error on the statistics X compared to D-Laplace
(at ϵ = .1) and in fact offers 30% lower error at ϵ = .01. This is
a critical finding for designers of privacy algorithms: optimizing
for aggregate error on published statistics does not reliably lead to
more accurate or fair outcomes for a downstream decision problem.
Finding M3: A jurisdiction’s distance from the nearest threshold
explains classification rates for D-Laplace but not DAWA. We plot
in Figure 1(c) a jurisdiction’s euclidean distance from the nearest
classification threshold against the rate of correct classification (for
ϵ = 0.1). We see that the results for D-Laplace are well-explained:
correct classification rate increases with distance from the threshold
and occurs in a fairly tight band for any given distance measure.
For the DAWA algorithm, however, we observe a different result.
Jurisdictions very far from the threshold have high classification
rates, as expected, presumably because there is simply not enough
noise to cause a failure for these cases. But for jurisdictions a smaller
distance from the threshold, there is a wide spread of classification
rate and some jurisdictions reasonably far from the threshold have
very low classification rates. This shows the impact of the bias
introduced in by DAWA: it sometimes groups together qualified ju-
risdictions with unqualified ones, causing them to be mis-classified.
5 PROBLEM 2: TITLE I FUNDS ALLOCATION
We now turn our attention to the important class of funds allocation
problems. A recent study estimated that the annual distribution of
at least $675 billion dollars relies on data released by the Census
Bureau [18]. This includes funding for educational grants, school
5
Table 2: Title I Funding Allocation
Assignees are all U.S. school districts; outcomes are the fraction of allocated
funds for each school district.
• Assignees: School Districts
• Outcome: [0, 1]
• Q = {exp, eli } where
exp(Ia ): average per student expenditures (for state containing
district a)
eli(Ia ): number of eligible students in district a.
• M(a;X) = X
exp
a · Xel ia∑
b∈A X
exp
b · Xel ib
lunch programs, highway construction, wildlife restoration, among
many others.
As an example of federal funds allocation, we consider Title I of
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 [23]. This is
one of the largest U.S. programs offering educational assistance to
disadvantaged children. In fiscal year 2015, Title I funding amounted
to a total of $14.4 billion, of which roughly $6.5 billion was given
out through “basic grants” which are our focus.
5.1 Problem Definition
The federal allocation is divided among qualifying school districts
in proportion to a count of children in the district aged 5 to 17 who
live in families who fall below the poverty level or receive a form
of federal financial aid [23]. This proportion is then weighted by a
factor that reflects the average per student educational expenditures
in the district’s state. The allocation formula is described formally
in Table 2, where the outcome represents the fraction of the total
allocation (which changes annually) the district will receive.
Assessing Fairness To assess fairness, we consider the difference
between the allocation vector based on the noisy statistics o˜ and
the allocation vector based on true counts o, assessing disparities
across assignees (in this case, districts). An allocation mechanism is
fair if the distance measures do not vary much across districts. We
can measure fairness ex ante, i.e., before running the (randomized)
allocation mechanism, as well as, ex post, i.e., on the outcome of the
allocation. We focus on ex ante measures as they capture disparities
due to the randomized allocation mechanism.
Multiplicative Allocation Error: For each district a, we com-
pute E[o˜a ]/oa . Differences in this measure across districts can be
interpreted as a measure of envy or unequal treatment. For in-
stance, an example of an unfair allocation would be one where
some districts have a ratio much larger than 1, while others have a
ratio smaller than 1. In plots we show the entire distribution of the
multiplicative allocation error across districts.
Misallocation permillion dollars: For each district a, we also
measure the dollar amount that is under or over-allocated to each
district, per million dollars allocated in total: γ (a) = (E[o˜a ] − oa ) ·
106. A significant difference in this measure between two districts
(γ (a) − γ (a′)) would suggest that districts are not treated equally
and could be interpreted as a measure of envy. Again, in plots we
show the distribution of γ (·) across all districts.
5.2 Empirical Findings
Experimental Setup The exact counts of Title I eligible students
per district are not available so we used per-district counts of free-
lunch eligible students as a proxy, as reported by The National
Center for Education Statistics for years 2013-2014. In addition, for
simplicity, we assume that the average per student expenditures
exp(Ia ) is public, following [4]. We obtained data for 15650 out of
the 18609 school districts.
We use two differentially private algorithms to estimate eli(Ia )
for each a – the Laplace mechanism and DAWA. The former adds
independent 0-mean noise to the count in each district. The latter
adds noise to the total count of groups of districts rather than
individual districts. The total noisy count of a group of districts
is then evenly divided among districts in the group. Thus, noisy
counts returned by DAWA are not unbiased. In both algorithms,
negative counts are rounded to zero. The resulting vector of student
counts may be fractional, but it is non-negative (see Appendix A.2).
For clarity of presentation, we show results on two states: Michi-
gan and Florida (see Figures 2 and 3). We chose these states because
the histograms of the number of eligible students per district show
contrasting properties. We obtained data for 888 districts in Michi-
gan, which included a number of small districts with the smallest
containing just 8 eligible students. On the other hand, Florida has a
smaller number of comparatively larger districts (we obtained data
for 74, the smallest having 49 eligible students).
Finding T1: In cases of low ϵ there are significant disparities in
outcomes (over- and under-allocation) using private statistics. Using
the Laplace mechanism, the mean allocation for small districts is
typically much higher than the true allocation while the mean
allocation of larger districts is typically lower. This is shown in
Figure 2(a), which plots the multiplicative allocation error of a
district versus its true allocation. The districts are shown sorted
by true allocation. The smallest districts see a 1.01× increase for
ϵ = 10, a 10× increase for ϵ = 0.1 and a 500× increase for ϵ = 0.001.
The largest districts see their allocations decrease by 0.001% for
ϵ = 10, 0.05% for ϵ = 0.1 and 50% for ϵ = 0.001.
The Laplace mechanism adds 0-mean noise to the data, and, in
expectation, the noisy counts should be the same as the true counts.
However, these counts could be negative and since negative counts
are rounded to 0, this adds an upward bias to the noisy counts.
Moreover, this bias increases the total number of students, thus
bringing down the weight of larger districts.
Figure 2(b) shows the absolute dollars misallocated per million
dollars allocated. In terms of raw dollar amounts, the largest districts
see the greatest misallocation and see a drop in funding of about
31,000 (see Figure 3(c)). On interpretation of this behavior is that
larger districts are being taxed to ensure that students in all districts
enjoy the same level of privacy protection.
The results for DAWA (Figures 2(d) and 2(f)) are worse than
those of the Laplace mechanism. At ϵ = 0.001 some districts get
about 555× their true allocation, while others get only a tenth of
their true allocation, in expectation whereas, under the Laplace
mechanism, every district gets at least 0.48x of their true allocation.
For districts in Florida (see Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(b)), we see
almost no difference at ϵ = 10. At ϵ = 0.1 there is very little
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(a) Multiplicative Allocation Error (b) Misallocation (c) Allocations
(d) Multiplicative Allocation Error (e) Misallocation (f) Allocations
Figure 2: Fairness in Allocation for Michigan using the Laplace Mechanism (top) and DAWA (bottom).
(a) Multiplicative Allocation Error (b) Misallocation
Total Min Max
ϵ = 0.1 Lap 1,606 -32 16DAWA 3,299 -32 22
ϵ = 0.001 Lap 563,960 -31,137 837DAWA 741,085 -9,051 1,673
(c) Misallocation per million dollars for Michigan
Figure 3: Fairness in allocation for Florida with the Laplace mechanism, and misallocation statistics for Michigan.
difference between the true and noisy allocations between districts
both additively and multiplicatively. At ϵ = 0.001, we see the same
effect of larger districts being taxed. However, the effects are less
prominent than in Michigan. This is because there are fewer small
counts in Florida as well as fewer districts overall, resulting in a
lower variance estimate of the total count used in the denominator
of the allocation formula.
Finding T2: Populations with small entitlements, relative to the pri-
vacy parameter ϵ , will experience significant misallocation.Detecting
small counts or the presence of small effects in data is incompatible
with differential privacy. This is a fundamental property of any
differentially private mechanism and the meaning of “small” de-
pends on ϵ : Any ϵ-differentially private algorithm can not distinguish
between counts that differ in τ (ϵ,δ ) = 1ϵ log
(
1
δ
)
, with probability
1−δ . Thus, no matter what differentially private algorithm one uses,
districts with sufficiently small counts will undergo mis-allocation.
Due to rounding, they tend to get higher allocations than they
deserve, in expectation, at the cost of larger districts.
This phenomenon is evident in Figure 2(c) and Figure 2(f) which
show the true and noisy allocations for all districts, when Laplace
andDAWAare used respectively. At ϵ = 0.001, for bothmechanisms,
all districts with a true allocation less than 0.001 end up with an
allocation of roughly 0.001 in expectation. This is because, in these
cases, these mechanism can not distinguish between the number of
students in those districts and 0, and rounding induces a positive
bias. On the other hand, the noisy allocations at ϵ = 0.1 track the
true allocations more closely (although even at ϵ = 0.1, there is a
threshold under which noisy counts of districts cannot reflect their
true magnitude), and at ϵ = 10 there is near no difference between
the true and noisy allocations.
Finding T3: Under some privacy mechanisms, districts with a greater
entitlement can receive a smaller expected allocation. Consider two
districts, a and b where a has a smaller number of eligible students
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Table 3: Apportionment of seats in parliament seats
Assignees are all Indian states; outcomes are seats in the Lower House of
Parliament.
• Assignees: States
• Outcomes: {1, 2, 3, . . . }
• Q = {tot }
tot (Ia ): total population in state a.
• M(Xa) =
– Calculate quota: qa =
Xtota∑
b∈A Xtotb
· 543
– Round to nearest positive integer: max{Round (qa ), 1}
than b. Naturally, the true allocation of a will be smaller than the
true allocation of b, and the inversion of this relationship would
violate a commonly held notion of fairness.
Under the Laplace mechanism, in expectation, we can show
that the allocation for a will be no larger than the allocation for
b. However, this is not true for the DAWA algorithm, because of
bias in estimated counts. In particular, for DAWA, a smaller district
may be grouped with other larger districts, while a larger district
may be grouped with other smaller districts. This results in the
smaller district getting a larger expected allocation than the larger
district. Empirically we find that, using DAWA with ϵ = 0.001, 381
out of the 888 districts exhibit at least one inversion, where a larger
district gets a smaller allocation.
6 PROBLEM 3: APPORTIONMENT OF
LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVES
Apportionment is the allocation of representatives to a state or
other geographic entity. We use parliamentary apportionment as
our example domain, and consider the particular case of allocating
representatives to the Indian Parliament’s Lower House, in which
a fixed number of representatives (543) are apportioned among 35
states,3 with each state having at least one representative.
Parliamentary apportionment is carried out using population
counts obtained from a census. While state population counts are
aggregates over large groups, they nevertheless cannot be released
in unmodified form in the standard model of differential privacy
(i.e., without an infinite privacy loss parameter), as they could reveal
presence of individuals in combination with other statistics.
In experiments, we consider ϵ values and requisite noise suffi-
cient to impact apportionment methods. Whether or not this degree
of noise would be used in practice for congressional apportionment,
the findings apply to apportionment problems over smaller geogra-
phies (e.g., allocating seats on a school board to school districts). In
particular, Laplace noise required to provide privacy at ϵ = 10−4 on
a population of 106 (a small state) has equivalent effects as using
ϵ = .1 on a smaller population of 103 (a small school district).
6.1 Problem Definition
The principle underlying fair apportionment is equal representa-
tion. Therefore the ideal allocation of seats to a state is given by the
state’s quota, which is its fraction of the population multiplied by
3We use ’state’ to refer to both states and union territories
the total number of representatives. A state’s quota is typically non-
integral, but an integral number of seats must be apportioned. Thus
any selected apportionment outcome will deviate from the quota
values, leading to some degree of disparity in representation. There
are various apportionment methods studied in literature [5, 29]. In
this paper we do not make a comparison between these algorithms,
rather we are interested in how adding Laplace noise affects rep-
resentation of states with different population counts. Thus, we
apply the following simple algorithm (Table 3): We compute the
quotas for all states and round them to the nearest integer, with the
constraint that every state receives at least one seat. This algorithm
is not guaranteed to allocate exactly 543 seats.
Assessing fairness A desirable fairness property is quota satis-
faction; i.e., the number of seats apportioned to a state should be
(roughly) proportional to the population of the state. When we add
Laplace noise, this property may not hold when considering spe-
cific random outcomes (i.e. ex-post), but could hold in expectation,
hence we focus on the deviation from the ideal standard of equal
representation—i.e., the quota values. We consider the following
two measures, where qa denotes the quota for state a (computed
on the true population counts):
Max-multiplicative: this measure considers pairs of states and
quantifies the disparity between the ratio of their allocation and
their quota: E
[
maxa,b ∈A
{
o˜a
qa −
o˜b
qb
}]
. Given a particular outcome
o, this measure can be interpreted as capturing the maximum in-
centive for an individual to move from one state to another state in
order to increase their representation. We consider the expectation
of this measure over the randomness in the privacy mechanism.
Average-Expected-Deviation: We also consider the expected
absolute deviation from quota on a per-state basis, which we then
average over the states: 1|A |
∑
a∈A
|E[o˜a ] − qa |. When this measure is
small, it means that most states will receive, on average over the
long run, an apportionment close to their quota.
These measures are quite different, as our empirical results will
show. The first is based on an ex-post measure of fairness, which
can be evaluated on a single apportionment outcome; we consider
the expected value of this measure. The second isolates a particular
state, evaluating the difference from quota of the expected appor-
tionment for that state, and then aggregates over the states. It can be
seen as an ex antemeasure of fairness: if, for example, two states had
equal expected deviation from quota, then, prior to any execution
of the randomized algorithm, they may not prefer the other state’s
future outcome. We note that an expected deviation from quota of
zero was used as a fairness criterion by Grimmett in the context of
a randomized (but non-private) method for apportionment [15].
6.2 Empirical Findings
Experimental SetupWe evaluate the impact on apportionment
outcomes when state population totals are perturbed by the Laplace
Mechanism, for varying ϵ . We do not consider more sophisticated
privacy mechanisms (as we did earlier) because, for this small set
of statistics, they do not improve upon the Laplace mechanism.
Finding A1. For some ϵ , noise introduced into population totals can
lead to more fair apportionment, in expectation. Figure 4(a) shows
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Figure 4: Allocation of seats to the Lower House of the Indian Parliament using population counts with Laplace noise.
the average-expected-deviation measure as it varies with ϵ . We see
that the introduction of noise actually improves over the baseline
deviation from quota, between approximately ϵ = 1.4−6 and ϵ =
3.8−4. This is because randomization can reduce, on average, the
deviation from quota caused by the integrality constraint.
A more detailed look at this phenomenon is provided by Fig-
ure 4(b), which shows per state results for a single privacy level,
ϵ = 1.4−5. For each state, the red dot shows the deviation from
quota on the true population totals (which may be positive or neg-
ative). The blue bars show the expected deviation from quota for
the respective state, often substantially lower. While this decreased
deviation is interesting, the expected apportionment is an unattain-
able outcome in any possible trial, so this may be an unsatisfying
property in practice.
FindingA2.As ϵ decreases, apportionment outcomes display a greater
multiplicative disparity between most favored and least favored state.
Figure 4(c) shows the max-multiplicative measure as it varies with
ϵ and here we see the fairness measure worsen as noise increases.
When considering this ex-post measure, noise does not help: appor-
tionment outcomes tend to include states receiving substantially
more than their quota while others receive substantially less, and
the disparity increases with the magnitude of the noise.
7 CONCLUSION
We empirically measure the impact of differentially private algo-
rithms on allocation processes, demonstrating with important prac-
tical examples that disparities can arise, particularly for smaller,
more protective values of the privacy-loss budget. Some practical
deployments of differential privacy have been revealed to use high
privacy-loss budgets [14], which would diminish impacts, however,
we note that the privacy loss budget must cover all public releases,
including the supporting statistics of any required allocation prob-
lems. Thus, in practical settings, the privacy loss budget devoted to
the statistics for any single allocation problem may be small.
Disparities in outcomes have a number of causes, including bias
added by the privacy algorithm, threshold conditions inherent to
some decisions, and divergent treatment of small and large popu-
lations. Our results suggest that algorithm designers evaluate the
fairness of outcomes, in addition to conventional error metrics.
We have not attempted to propose remedies to the problems
shown, but we note that even the form of remedy is not clear.
Privacy mechanisms could be customized and optimized for specific
assignment problems, but this would leave agencies like the Census
in the untenable position of designing an algorithm for each of the
thousands of assignment problems that rely on the public data they
release. Assignment algorithms could also try to account for the
noise added for privacy, but this also presents challenges: some
algorithms (including DAWA) do not directly support the release
of error bounds; furthermore, changing decision procedures might
violate the law. We hope to evaluate these approaches, and other
mitigation techniques, in future work.
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A APPENDIX
The following configuration details apply to all three problems
investigated. Configuration details specific to each problem are
described in the subsections that follow.
Privacy AlgorithmsWe evaluated the following algorithms. The
Laplacemechanism [9] adds noise sampled from amean-zero Laplace
distribution. The scale of the noise is calibrated to ϵ and a property
of the computed quantity called the sensitivity. We use a variant of
the Laplace mechanism in which the desired statistics are expressed
in vector form and the sensitivity is calculated automatically (cf. Vec-
torLaplace in [30]). For one problem (voting rights), we use a slight
adaptation of the Laplace Mechanism, which we call D-Laplace,
as described in Appendix A.1. DAWA [20] applies a differentially
private pre-processing step to group together statistics and smooth
their estimates. It can be applied to an ordered sequence of statis-
tics, such as a histogram, and it selects a partition of the statistics
into contiguous intervals so that statistics with similar value are
grouped together. It uses the Laplace Mechanism as a subroutine to
measure each group, and derives smoothed estimates for the statis-
tics within each group. This grouping and smoothing can greatly
reduce total error at the expense of introducing statistical bias.
Implementation All privacy algorithms were implemented in the
Ektelo framework [30], which is available open-source.4
Parameters The following experimental configuration is com-
mon to all experiments. Across all experiments, we evaluate ϵ ∈
[10−6 . . . 101]. For readability, some figures report a subset of ϵ val-
ues sufficient to capture the dependence on this parameter. For each
4https://ektelo.github.io
parameter configuration, each algorithm is run for 1000 random
trials. Reported results are averages across the trials.
Hardware/Software All experiments were run on commodity
hardware (e.g., personal laptop) running Python 3 with the Ana-
conda installation.
A.1 Problem 1: Minority Language Voting
Rights
Data Source and Preparation The Census Bureau releases Sec-
tion 203 voting rights determinations in a Federal Register notice
and also posts accompanying public-use data.5 This data undergoes
confidentiality protections before public release, but we treat it as
ground truth for the purpose of simulating the impact of privacy
mechanisms on the determinations. The statistics used for the 2016
determinations are contained in an Excel file.6
We filtered the provided data to focus on a single language (the
“Hispanic” minority language). This language alone constitutes the
majority of the covered jurisdictions. We also filtered the data to
consider only counties and minor civil divisions as jurisdictions.
According to Section 203, it is possible for larger jurisdictions (e.g.
states) to qualify for the benefit, in which case all contained juris-
dictions qualify, but we ignored this case (which is rare) to simplify
the analysis. Finally, we omitted a small number of jurisdictions
which were reported to have zero voting age citizen population in
the public use files, which occurred due to Census confidentiality
protections.
The resulting data provided the values for the variables described
in table 1, namely Xlep ,Xvac ,Xil l for a total of 5180 jurisdictions,
of which 175 were Covered.
Privacy AlgorithmsWe used two algorithms for computing the
noisy statistics X˜. Applying the standard Laplace Mechanism to the
original queries Q = {vac, lep, lit} would require noise scaled to a
sensitivity of 3. Instead, we used the D-Laplace algorithm, which
adds noise to decomposed queries Q ′ = {q1,q2,q3} where:
q1 = lit
q2 = lep − lit
q3 = vac − lep
These queries compose in parallel and have sensitivity one (because
the addition or removal of any individual can change only one
query answer, by a value of one). The D-Laplace algorithm uses
the Laplace mechanism to estimate answers to Q ′ and then derives
estimates to Q from them. In particular,
X˜l it = q˜1
X˜lep = q˜1 + q˜2
X˜vac = q˜1 + q˜2 + q˜3
In experiments, D-Laplace performed consistently better than a
standard application of the Laplace mechanism.
The second algorithm is DAWA, as described in section 2. We
run DAWA on the same underlying data vector used by D-Laplace—
i.e., the vector produced by applying the queries Q ′ to the data.
5https://www.census.gov/rdo/data/voting_rights_determination_file.html
6https://www.census.gov/rdo/pdf/5_Section203_comparisons_December5_2016.xlsx
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This results in a data vector of size 3 · 5180 = 15540. The ordering
of the cells can affect the output of the DAWA algorithm because
the algorithm searches (privately) for continuous regions that are
approximately uniform in their counts. We ordered the cells by
state id, then county id.
A.2 Problem 2: Title I Funds Allocation
Data Source and Preparation We obtained the desired data by
using the table generator offered by the National Center for Edu-
cation Statistics7. We selected the Number of free lunch eligible
students for each district for the 2013 − 2014 years. Though there
are a total of 18609 districts across all the states and associated
territories, only 15650 of those districts contained data that were
both applicable and met the NCES data quality standards.
Privacy AlgorithmsWe used the Laplace mechanism and DAWA
to generate the differentially private counts of eligible students in
each district. For the Laplace mechanism, noise from the Laplace
distribution with parameter 1/ϵ was added to the number of eligible
students from each district and negative counts were rounded up
to 0. To run DAWA, we ordered the districts in alphabetical order
by their name, and constructed a histogram of counts with each
cell representing the number of eligible students in that district.
DAWA was then executed on this histogram to generate noisy
counts. Again, negative counts in the output were rounded up to 0.
A.3 Problem 3: Apportionment of Legislative
Representatives
Data Source and PreparationWe used the 1971 state population
totals published by the Indian Parliament in the budget of 2006/07.8
This source provides data for 35 states and union territories (it does
not include the newly formed state of Telangana).
Privacy Algorithms We used the Laplace mechanism with the
state population totals to produce differentially private data. Any
negative population counts were rounded to 0. As mentioned earlier,
more sophisticated privacy mechanisms were not included because
they do not improve upon the Laplace mechanism for this particular
problem.
7https://nces.ed.gov/ccd/elsi/
8Indian Census: https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/es2006-07/chapt2007/tab97.pdf
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